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Chinaʼs Indigenous Innovation Policies and the
World Trade Organization
By Daniel C.K. Chow*
Abstract: China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies, regulations,
and strategies that are designed to develop an indigenous capacity to create
innovation and advanced technology as part of China’s larger strategy to ascend to
the top ranks of the world’s industrialized nations. As part of these policies, China
has implemented rules related to government procurement, i.e. the purchase by
Chinese government entities of products from private vendors. China’s policies
provide strong incentives for the purchase of products containing technology or
intellectual property owned by Chinese business enterprises. U.S. companies claim
that these policies are discriminatory and could preclude them from selling their
products to the Chinese government, which has an annual government procurement
budget estimated by some to be as high as $1 trillion. U.S. companies also claim that
these policies are designed to force them to transfer their technology to China as a
condition of selling products to the Chinese government. Critics of these policies in
the U.S. Congress and in U.S. industry groups argue that they are unfair, illegal, and
in violation of China’s obligations under the World Trade Organization. This article
assesses these arguments and concludes that China is within its legal rights in
promulgating its government procurement policies favoring products containing
indigenous technology.

* Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, the Ohio State Michael E. Moritz
College of Law. Thanks to Cindy Bi for her research assistance and to Valeria Silva, Henning Grosse
Ruse-Kahn, Timothy Webster, and Juscelino Colares for their comments and criticisms. Thanks also to
participants in workshops held at the law schools of Arizona State University, Duquesne University,
Case Western University, and Stetson University for their comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies,
regulations, and strategies that create incentives for Chinese enterprises to
create advanced technologies in order to propel the People’s Republic of
China (China) into the leading ranks of the most competitive nations in the
world.1 One key goal of these strategies is to develop “national champions”2:
Chinese companies that aspire to compete effectively with the largest and
most powerful multinational companies (MNCs) in the world today.3 Since
innovation and advanced technology are crucial requirements of
competitiveness in the modern global economy, a key component of these
strategies is to spur Chinese entities to develop the capacity to create

1
For a detailed discussion of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies, see U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-514, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT,
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY (USITC Pub. 4199, 2010) [hereinafter ITC Report].
2
See id. at 5-6. “National champions” is a term used by the Chinese government to describe stateowned or state-invested enterprises. These enterprises, all controlled by the state, will be the leading
business entities in China.
3
See id.
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innovative and advanced technologies.4 By “technology,” this Article refers
to knowledge, know-how, and information, usually protected by
intellectual property (IP) rights such as patents, trademarks, trade secrets,
and other forms of IP.5 In China’s view, it can never ascend to the leading
ranks of industrialized nations if it continues to be a recipient or importer of
advanced technologies or IP created by innovator countries, such as the
United States.6 Innovator countries are often reluctant to provide access to
their “core” technologies but often only provide access to their secondary
technologies in order to preserve a competitive advantage.7 China wants to
become a leading innovator country in its own right and does not want to
depend on access to technology from the United States, Japan, and western
European nations, which now dominate the area of technology innovation.8
To encourage innovation, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies
create incentives in the form of government procurement policies that favor
the purchase of products that embody technology created or owned by
Chinese business entities.9 Government procurement refers to the purchase
of goods and services by government entities from private vendors.10
Today in most countries, government procurement accounts for 15%–20%
of gross domestic product (GDP).11 In some countries, such as India,
government procurement accounts for 30% of GDP. In 2011, the United
States government spent about $537 billion,12 or about 14% of the federal
4

See id. at 5-1 (“From China’s perspective, its indigenous innovation policies are part of a
legitimate and necessary effort to raise the level of domestic innovation to respond to pressing
economic and development challenges.”).
5
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 324 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS].
6
The leading industrialized nations of the world—the United States, some of the countries of the
European Union, and Japan—are all innovator countries. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 12 (2d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].
7
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 325.
8
Id. at 328.
9
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies that deal with many different aspects
of China’s economy. This Article focuses on the use of government procurement policies as an
incentive to spur local innovation, but there are many other aspects of China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policies that involve technical standards, competition policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law,
taxation policy, and intellectual property rights and enforcement. See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-1.
10
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 173 (Aspen 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
11
Id.
12
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-919, IMPROVED AND EXPANDED USE
COULD SAVE BILLIONS IN ANNUAL PROCUREMENT COSTS (2012). The size of government
procurement in China depends on what types of entities (central, sub-central, and state owned
enterprises) are included. State owned enterprises, or companies that are administrative units of the
state, continue to dominate China’s economy. If spending by state-owned enterprises is included,
spending figures increase significantly.
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budget,13 on the purchase of goods and services from private sector
vendors. The United States estimates that China now spends between $88–
$200 billion per year on government procurement,14 while the European
Union estimates that China spends up to $1 trillion in annual government
procurement.15 The growth in government procurement provides private
vendors with eager government buyers with enormous resources and the
ability to pay in cash for a fleet of jet passenger airplanes or immense
infrastructure projects, such as the building of airports and bridges. Since
China states that its procurement budget grew ten-fold between 2002 and
2012, China’s government procurement is likely to become even more
important going forward as a source of revenue for private businesses.16
Not surprisingly, many U.S. companies are eager to sell products and
services to the Chinese government.17 If Chinese government entities are
required to purchase products that embody technology created or owned by
Chinese entities, however, U.S. companies may find few opportunities to
sell products to Chinese government entities.
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies have triggered a storm of
controversy and protest in the United States.18 Many U.S. companies argue
that these policies have now surpassed counterfeiting and commercial
piracy as the most important IP issue between the United States and
China.19 U.S. companies claim that these policies blatantly discriminate
against U.S. goods in China’s government procurement and do not fairly
reciprocate the trading relationship between the United States and China.20
Currently U.S. state and local governments purchase billions of dollars in
13

See Jeanne Sahadi, Cutting Washington Could Hit Main Street, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/federal-spending/index.htm.
14
See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-9 (reporting $88 billion figure); WAYNE M. MORRISON,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA–U.S. TRADE ISSUES 43 (July 17, 2013) (testimony of Karen
Laney, acting director of operations of the International Trade Commission, reporting the $200 billion
figure).
15
China Unlikely to Join WTO Agreement, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/21/c_131489311.htm.
16
When China’s entry into the WTO was being negotiated, China’s government procurement
budget was only a fraction of what it is today. In 2002, China’s government procurement budget was
only $16 billion, but it grew ten-fold over the last decade. See Lan Lan, Government Procurement
Expanded 10-Fold, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:24 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201207/03/content_15546264.htm (Deputy Finance Minister Wang Boan stating that China’s government
procurement budget expanded from $16 billion in 2002 to $178 billion in 2012).
17
Jose W. Fernandez, Fostering a Rules-Based System in the U.S.-China Economic Relationship,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/197015.htm.
18
See Levin Warns of Potential Hill Action on China, CONGRESSDAILY, July 16, 2010, at 10-10.
19
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-519, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (USITC
Pub. 4199, 2011).
20
China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Politic: How Great a Threat?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
112th Cong. (2011).
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goods and services from Chinese companies, but China’s government
procurement policies effectively close off the Chinese government
procurement market to U.S. private businesses.21 According to U.S.
companies, most U.S. products will not qualify for purchase by the Chinese
government under the criteria set forth by these policies. In addition, U.S.
companies claim that these policies are designed to force them to transfer
their advanced technologies to Chinese entities as a condition of being able
to sell goods and services to the Chinese government.22 If they do not
transfer their technologies to Chinese entities, these U.S. companies will be
shut out from the highly lucrative Chinese government procurement
market.23 Furthermore, if U.S. companies do transfer their technologies to
Chinese entities, then the technologies will be stolen or pirated.
Consequently, U.S. companies argue that China intends for these policies
to help it steal U.S. intellectual property rights.24 A later part of this Article
explains, in detail, why U.S. companies believe that they are being coerced
into transferring their technologies to Chinese entities where the technology
will be stolen.25
Spurred on by the concerns of U.S. businesses, the United States
government has put pressure on Chinese authorities to change these
policies.26 Some critics argue that China’s policies violate its WTO
obligations with the United States.27 The United States is a member of the
WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA),28 which prohibits the
United States from discriminating against goods and services from other
GPA members in favor of U.S. goods and services in government
21

See David Barboza, Bridge Comes to San Francisco with a Made in China Label, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2011, at A1 (describing $7.2 billion spent by California in government procurement of Chinese
services to build a bridge in San Francisco, and purchases by New York of a wide array of Chinese
services and goods related to infrastructure projects).
22
See MORRISON, supra note 14, at 30 (quoting a U.S. WTO representative as stating that China’s
policies were aimed at “coercing technology transfer” and that “Chinese regulations . . . frequently
called for technology transfer, and in certain cases, conditioned, or proposed to condition, the eligibility
for government benefits or preferences on intellectual property being owned or developed in China, or
being licensed, in some cases exclusively, to a Chinese party”).
23
See id. at 29–30 (noting concerns of U.S. Chamber of Commerce that China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policies would “make it virtually impossible for any non-Chinese companies to participate
in China’s government procurement” without transferring their technology to China).
24
See Geithner Slams China’s Intellectual Property Policies, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/us-china-geithner-idUSTRE78M15G20110923 (quoting a
statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a
continuation of its “decades old strategy to steal American intellectual property rights”).
25
See infra Part II.A.
26
See U.S. to Raise IPR Issues with China, CHINA DAILY (May 22, 2010), http://www.china.org.cn/
business/2010-05/22/content_20096107.htm.
27
See infra Part III.B.
28
WTO Government Procurement Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/government-procurement/wto-government-procurement-agreement
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
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procurement.29 Under the GPA and federal laws, the United States is
prohibited from using federal funds to purchase goods and services from
non-GPA members. Unlike the federal government, however, state
governments can and do purchase goods and services from China.30 China
is currently not a member of the GPA, however, so it can effectively
require Chinese government entities to purchase goods and services from
Chinese vendors instead of U.S. vendors. Since the GPA is a “plurilateral”
agreement under the WTO,31 WTO members decide whether to join the
GPA on a voluntary basis. By contrast, other WTO agreements, such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are mandatory treaties that are
automatically binding on all nations that accede to the WTO. Since China
is within its rights in not acceding to the GPA, China is under no obligation
to provide reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment to foreign goods in
government procurement and is free to discriminate in favor of Chinese
goods. As a result, China is permitted under the WTO to discriminate in
favor of Chinese goods and against foreign firms in awarding government
procurement contracts.32 Some critics, however, reject China’s position
and argue that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies violate China’s
obligations under the WTO.33 A later part of this Article surveys these
arguments and concludes that they are either invalid or ineffective.
This Article examines the controversy between the United States and
China in detail. Part II reviews China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and
the concerns of U.S. companies. This part explains the crux of U.S.
companies’ complaints that these policies are unfair because they “force”
them to transfer technology to China and help Chinese companies steal
their intellectual property. Part III then analyzes whether China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies are in violation of the WTO agreements.
This part examines whether China is allowed to discriminate in government
procurement under the WTO agreements,34 as well as under China’s
Protocol of Accession to the WTO,35 i.e., the legal instrument setting forth
29

See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
30
See Barboza, supra note 21.
31
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173.
32
See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-8–5-9; INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, WRITTEN COMMENTS TO
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO FEDERAL
REGISTER NOTICE REGARDING CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS ACCESSION COMMITMENTS TO THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 5 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.tiaonline.org/sites/
default/files/pages/PUSITOChinaWTOComplianceFiling.pdf.
33
See infra Part III.B.
34
Official versions of all WTO agreements are available on the WTO website. See Documents and
Resources, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/res_e/res_e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
35
See World Trade Org., Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Ministerial
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the conditions of China’s admission to the WTO. This part also examines
other arguments by critics that China has violated other WTO obligations.
Part III reaches several tentative conclusions. First, China is within its
legal rights to discriminate in favor of Chinese goods and services because
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies do not violate any significant WTO
obligations. Second, although some aspects of China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policies may violate certain peripheral WTO obligations, the
remedy for these violations under the WTO is to bring the offending
measures into compliance with the WTO Agreements.36
Bringing
violations into WTO compliance, however, does not address the key
underlying problem confronting the United States government and U.S.
companies. The ultimate goal of the United States is to induce China to
join the GPA, which after all is a voluntary decision on the part of China,
given that no WTO member is required to join the GPA.37 No litigation in
the WTO or pressure from the United States will induce China to join the
GPA on terms acceptable to the United States.38 Rather, threatening China
with litigation in the WTO over its Indigenous Innovation Policies could
have the opposite effect of hardening China’s stance and delaying China’s
accession to the GPA. What may be necessary in the long term are trade
concessions from the United States that will serve as an inducement for
China to join the GPA.39
Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432 (2002) [hereinafter China’s Protocol of Accession], available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf.
36
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 67. The ultimate
goal of the WTO is to induce an offending member to bring a non-complying measure into conformity
with the WTO agreements. Although the aggrieved member may be authorized in some cases to
impose retaliatory trade measures on the offending member, these measures are always viewed as
temporary. The long-term goal is to induce compliance with WTO obligations, which will reduce or
eliminate trade distortions caused by the offending measure and produce the greatest benefit to the
WTO system. See id.
37
See id. at 173.
38
Joining the GPA is completely up to each WTO member. There is no legal basis within the
WTO to legally coerce a member to join the GPA, so any litigation by the United States in the WTO
would be part of a campaign to pressure China to join the GPA against its will. China has recently
demonstrated that it has no tolerance for being bullied by the United States or any other country. See
China Defends Expanded Military After Memories of Bullying, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-04/china-defends-expanded-military-after-memories-ofbullying-1-.html (discussing lessons learned after being bullied). Both the United States and the
European Union have objected to China’s past offers to join the GPA because China is making
commitments that obligate only a few government entities to purchase foreign goods and services and
involve only a small volume of trade. See Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement
Agreement “Highly Disappointing,” REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50G720121206. If the United States, the EU, and
other GPA members were to accept China’s offer, China would get the full benefit of the more
expansive commitments of the United States and the EU in exchange for a narrow commitment on the
part of China. This type of tactic leads many critics to argue that China tries to exploit the WTO
system.
39
A trade concession is a trade benefit given to China by the United States as part of a deal that
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II. A CLOSER LOOK AT CHINA’S INDIGENOUS INNOVATION
POLICIES
Under China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies, PRC government
entities are encouraged to buy products that have been officially accredited
by PRC authorities.40 Only enterprises having Chinese legal person status41
can apply for accreditation for a product.42 To be accredited, a product
must have been manufactured by an entity that has full ownership of
intellectual property rights in China, either by creating the rights or by
acquiring them.43 For example, in the case of a product protected by
patents, the Chinese entity must be the registered patent owner in China.44
If the product also has a trademark, a Chinese entity must be the
registered trademark owner in China before the product can be accredited
for procurement by Chinese government entities.45 An additional set of
measures creates incentives and priorities for the purchase of accredited
products by PRC government authorities.46 The combination of these
China will join the GPA. For example, the United States federal government might offer to purchase a
large quantity of Chinese made goods and services, conditioned upon China’s accession to the GPA. In
addition to providing financial benefits, a trade concession would be politically more acceptable to
China’s leaders because it would be perceived as a carrot and not as a stick. Bowing to pressure—a
stick—might revive painful memories of China’s long period of domination by foreign powers. See
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 8–9
(West, 2d ed. 2009).
40
See Guojia Zizhu Chuangxin Changpin Rending Guanli Banfa (Shixing) (国家自主创新产品认
定管理办法(试行) [Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous
Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Sci. & Tech., the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n
& the Ministry of Fin., Dec. 28, 2006, effective Dec. 28, 2006), ¶ 2 [hereinafter Trial Measures].
41
A Chinese legal person is an enterprise or business entity formed under Chinese law. See Ming
Fa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=2696. Foreign entities can establish a Chinese business entity known as a ForeignInvested Enterprise under PRC law. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 85 (West 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & HAN, DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA].
42
See Trial Measures, supra note 40, ¶ 3.
43
Id. ¶ 4.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
For example, government entities are required to give priorities in their budgets for the purchase
of accredited products. See Zizhu Chuangxin Changpin Zhengfu Caigou Yusuan Guanli Banfa (自主创
新产品政府采购预算管理办法) [Administrative Measures on Government Procurement Budget for
Indigenous Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., effective Apr. 3, 2007) (China).
Accredited products enjoy financial incentives such as price reductions and extra weight in product
evaluations. Zizhu Chuangxin Chanpin Zhengfu Caigou Pingshen Banfa (自主创新产品政府采购评
审办法) [Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products for Government Procurement]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., effective Apr. 3, 2007) (China). The Ministry of Finance
officially revoked these measures in June 2011, but the American Chamber of Commerce believes that
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measures means that few opportunities may exist for non-accredited
products in PRC government procurement.
As noted earlier, the goal of these policies is to encourage domestic
innovation, and to build and support “national champions.”47 By providing
financial incentives that favor domestic innovation, the Chinese
government hopes to nurture research and develop indigenous capabilities
to create advanced technologies rather than relying upon access to
technologies from foreign suppliers, which has been the case for China
during the past three decades since the beginning of its economic reforms.48
China believes that relying on technologies created by foreign countries
places China at a significant competitive disadvantage.49 In a typical
technology transfer transaction that occurs between parties from the United
States and China, the United States IP owner will register patents,
trademarks, or copyrights with the appropriate PRC authorities.50 The U.S.
party is the legal owner of the IP rights in China and then licenses the use
of the rights to a Chinese entity in a technology transfer agreement.51 The
Chinese licensee is permitted to use the technology but remains a licensee,
not an owner.52 The disadvantages of this approach are two-fold. First, the
U.S. licensor will typically charge licensing fees or royalties, which may be
onerous. Second, the U.S. licensor may be unwilling to license its most
advanced, cutting-edge technologies, but will only license secondary or
outdated technologies to the Chinese licensee.53 U.S. IP owners have held
longstanding concerns that any technology that is transferred may be
misappropriated or stolen.54 An additional concern is that when contract
disputes arise between the parties, the technology licensing agreements
may be difficult to enforce in Chinese courts.55 Another concern is that
challenges persist as local provinces have not stopped applying the national regulations or their own
local legislation. See AMCHAM CHINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA: 2013 WHITE PAPER 42 (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.amchamchina.org/article/11206. For
instance, on November 11, 2011, Guangdong Province issued a local regulation providing preferences
to indigenous innovation. Id. In addition, the central level Ministry of Industry and Information issued
its 2012 Catalogue for Indigenous Innovation of Major Technical Equipment on January 12, 2012 to
replace the 2009 version, which gave clear preferences to indigenous innovation. The 2012 catalogue
does not provide clear guidelines on whether indigenous innovation will still be given preferences
leaving U.S. businesses with uncertainty on whether other Chinese central level authorities will respect
the 2011 revocation by the Ministry of Finance of the measures creating preferences for indigenous
innovation. Id. at 44.
47
ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-6.
48
See id. at 5-2–5-3.
49
See Siyuan An & Brian Peck, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of its WTO
Obligations and Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375, 385 (2011).
50
See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 328.
54
Id. at 328.
55
Effective enforcement of court judgments in China remains a serious issue. Many barriers, such
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when the licensing agreement is terminated, the licensee may continue to
use the technology, now in its possession, without permission.56 For all of
these reasons, U.S. IP owners are concerned about the risks involved in
technology transfer contracts. One method of mitigating these risks is to
demand high royalty payments. A second method is to license only nonessential and secondary technologies while keeping advanced core
technologies in-house.
China has recognized that its dependence on foreign innovation places
it at a competitive disadvantage and to some extent at the mercy of foreign
IP owners.57 China is also keenly aware that it cannot assume a role as a
leading economic power unless it becomes an innovator nation. Nations
that are innovators not only create competitive products but also set
industry standards that other competitors will need to follow.58 In the
modern global economy, nations can be divided into two categories: (1)
innovators and exporters of technology and (2) recipients and importers of
technology.59 No country that falls in the latter category can be considered
to be a leading economic power.60 It is no coincidence that the United
States, Japan, and certain members of the EU lead the list of innovator
countries;61 China’s long-term goal is to be among them. To achieve that
goal, China needs to wean itself off its dependence on acquiring technology
from foreign nations, with all of its shortcomings, and to develop its own
capacity to innovate and create advanced technology. China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policies are a key component of its strategy to reach this goal.62

as a lack of resources and local protectionism, prevent the enforcement of the majority of court
judgments. See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 40, at 531–32.
56
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 325.
57
See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 385.
58
Setting global standards is another part of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies. See ITC
Report, supra note 1, at 5-12–5-20. China is determined to use its own national standards and to
promulgate them on a global level. The promulgation of Chinese standards will give technology that is
of Chinese origin a competitive advantage in the world marketplace as other countries will need to
adopt China’s standards and, in the process, use China’s technology. This implicates a second issue
under the WTO: China’s use of its own national technical standards when international standards are
already available and should be used instead. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement) requires the use of international standards over national standards whenever
international standards are available, so China’s policies may be in tension with the TBT. See CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 276.
59
See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 12.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-2–5-3 (“[I]ndigenous innovation policies encompass several
of the Chinese government’s long-term policy goals, including promoting domestic companies’
contributions to the Chinese economy rather than relying on foreign know-how and technology,
building domestic R&D capabilities to upgrade Chinese firms’ innovative capacity, and generally
increasing the share of added value that Chinese companies contribute to China’s economy.”).
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A. Concerns of U.S. Multinational Companies
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies have caused great
consternation and concern among U.S. companies that wish to sell products
and services to the Chinese government.63 U.S. companies argue that these
policies are discriminatory and are designed to force them to transfer their
technology to China.64 What exactly are these arguments?
Let us suppose that Company A, a U.S.-based company, wishes to sell
products to the PRC government. Company A has patents for the products
registered in the United States, as well as patents for the products registered
in China.65 In order to sell products to the Chinese government, these
products must be accredited for government procurement by the
appropriate Chinese authorities. Company A is concerned with a measure
that only Chinese legal enterprises can apply for accreditation of their
products, and the Chinese enterprise must be the full owner of any
intellectual property rights embedded in the products or the service.66 In
this case, although Company A owns the Chinese patent, Company A is not
a Chinese legal enterprise, but is a U.S. company. Company A is not
entitled to apply for accreditation for its products and, as a result, the
Chinese government will not purchase Company A’s products. If
Company B, a Chinese enterprise, sells competing products that are
accredited, then the Chinese government will purchase the products from
B, even if the products contain a lower level of technology or are inferior in
some other respect to A’s products. U.S. companies argue that these
63

See Vicki Needham, Chinese Policies Hurting U.S. Businesses, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/157811-chinese-business-policies-hurting-usbusinesses (expressing concern of American Chamber of Commerce (representing U.S. businesses) that
China’s policies related to indigenous innovation and government procurement favor local companies
over foreign competition).
64
See Michele Nash-Hoff, Chinese Innovation Mercantilism is Hurting American Manufacturers,
CAN AM. MFG. BE SAVED? (Dec. 12, 2012), http://savingusmanufacturing.com/blog/outsourcing/
chinese-innovation-mercantilism-is-hurting-american-manufacturers/ (claiming that Chinese policies
are designed to force technology transfer to China). For a particularly aggressive criticism of how
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are hurting U.S. companies, see ROBERT D. ATKINSON, ITIF,
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM (Feb. 2012),
http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf.
The U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury has publicly stated that China has been “very, very aggressive” in stealing U.S. intellectual
property and that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a continuation of this strategy. See
Timothy Geithner, China Very, Very Aggressive in Stealing U.S. Technology, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/23/timothy-geithner-china-very-aggressive-stealingtechnology_n_977509.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2011).
65
Under the principle of territoriality, each patent is independent and is a creature of the legal
system in which the rights are created and provides protection only within the borders of the nation
grating the patent in the absence of an international agreement providing for cross border recognition.
Thus, in the example above, Company A has two patents: a U.S. patent and a Chinese patent for the
same invention. See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 16–17.
66
See Trial Measures, supra note 40, ¶¶ 3–4.
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policies discriminate against U.S. products and services in Chinese
government procurement.67
Given China’s current policies, how would it be possible for a U.S.
company to sell products with U.S. created technology to the Chinese
government? One obvious approach would be for a U.S. company to
assign or sell ownership of its intellectual property rights to an unaffiliated
Chinese legal enterprise.68 An assignment is a transfer of complete
ownership of the intellectual property, so the Chinese purchaser now
becomes the owner of the technology and can obtain accreditation for the
products made using the technology. Company A has been able to earn a
profit by selling its technology to a Chinese purchaser, so in this sense
Company A has been able to benefit indirectly from China’s government
procurement. However, since the advanced technology itself is the most
valuable business asset in this transaction,69 not the products that embody
the technology,70 most MNCs would find such an approach to be
completely unacceptable.
An alternative, less-drastic method that will allow the U.S. IP owner
to retain some control over the technology involves a series of complicated
steps beginning with establishing a business entity in China, which the U.S.
company will own in whole or in part. The Chinese business entity will
then serve as the recipient of the technology. This process necessarily
involves the transfer of technology to the Chinese business entity. This
required step is what U.S. companies are referring to when they claim that
China’s policies are “forcing” them to transfer their IP to China.71 A
67

This scenario has played out in a number of industries, affecting U.S. wind energy companies,
telecommunications manufacturers, software companies, and the automotive industry. For example,
“[f]oreign firms have limited access to the government procurement market, which accounts for all of
the largest wind farm projects in China. This situation sharply limits the prospects for U.S.-based wind
energy companies in China. Chinese joint-venture companies that are majority foreign-owned
reportedly are not considered to be domestic companies in the concession process, largely excluding
foreign firms that have invested in local production in China.” U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA:
EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY 5–19 (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf.
68
The proper procedure is for A to assign its Chinese patent to a Chinese legal enterprise, which
becomes the new owner. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 5, at 328–29.
69
For a discussion of the importance of technology in modern international business, see id. at
324–25.
70
For example, assume that a high quality detergent contains an enzyme formula that is protected
by a patent in China. For the purposes of this Article, the technology involved is the enzyme formula,
not the detergent. The enzyme formula is the core business asset, not the boxes of detergent that are
sold to the Chinese buyer. Assigning the patent to a Chinese business entity would grant the assignee
the know-how to make the formula to use it in all detergent in the future.
71
The argument that China is “forcing” U.S. companies to transfer their technology is often made
in the popular press. See, e.g., Robert Oak, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy Bigger Threat to U.S.
Economy
Than
Offshore
Outsourcing,
ECONOMIC
POPULIST
(June
18,
2012),
http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/chinas-indigenous-innovation-policy-bigger-threat-us-
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detailed discussion of these steps follows below.
The MNC will first have to set up a Foreign-Invested Enterprise (FIE)
in China. By law, an FIE is a Chinese legal entity that is a special vehicle
designed for foreign direct investment, i.e., a recipient of foreign capital
and technology.72 The FIE is set up and owned by a foreign entity, i.e., an
entity that is a national of a country other than China.73 All FIEs must be
specifically approved by the Chinese government and operate under a legal
regime specifically designed for FIEs.74 An FIE could be a joint venture,
i.e., a business entity that is jointly owned by the U.S. company and a local
Chinese partner, or it can be a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE),
which is essentially a wholly-owned subsidiary of the MNC.75 Although an
FIE is partly or wholly owned by the U.S. multinational company, the FIE
is a business entity formed under Chinese law, so it is a Chinese legal
person. The next step is for the U.S. MNC to have the Chinese legal
enterprise register the U.S. company’s intellectual property rights in the
name of the Chinese business entity. For example, if Company A has a
U.S. patent for an invention, then Company A will authorize its FIE to
register the same patent in China using the FIE’s own name. The
registration of the patent in China under the name of the FIE means that the
FIE now becomes the official and legal owner of the patent in China.76
Finally, the FIE manufactures the product using the patent or other
intellectual property registered in the FIE’s own name. At this point, the
FIE, a Chinese legal person that owns the IP rights, can now apply for
accreditation for its property because the FIE has fulfilled all of the
requirements for accreditation under China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policies. This process is what U.S. companies describe as “forcing” them
to transfer their technologies to China in order to bid on PRC government

economy-offshore-outsourcing (“China’s indigenous innovation policy means corporations are forced
to technology transfer to China their intellectual know-how, advanced technologies in order to even do
business in China and certain to obtain Chinese government contracts.”). These arguments do not set
out in detail the discussion in the text on the use of Chinese business entities by which this technology
transfer is accomplished. The discussion below sets forth a step-by-step procedure for technology
transfer that will allow a U.S. corporation to qualify for accreditation in order to sell to the Chinese
government.
72
See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 85.
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, Chapter 2.
76
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27,
2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 8, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=
178664 (“After the application is granted, the applying unit(s) or individual(s) shall be deemed the
patentee(s).”). The PRC Patent Law distinguishes only between foreigners, foreign enterprise, and
foreign organizations without a regular residence or business site in China on one hand and Chinese
companies and individuals on the other. Id. arts. 18–19. FIEs are Chinese companies so they can apply
for patent rights. See GRAHAM BROWN, CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE 29–110 (2005).
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procurement contracts.77
B. Risks to U.S. Companies in Complying with China’s
Accreditation Policies
From the perspective of U.S. MNCs, going through all of the steps set
forth above in order to meet the conditions to obtain accreditation and to
have its products qualify for government procurement in China is both
burdensome and full of risk.78 Setting up an FIE in China is a time
consuming process. For example, setting up a joint venture can easily take
18 months from the start of negotiations to the final approval of the joint
venture by the appropriate authorities.79 Unlike the simple procedure for
establishing a corporation in most states in the United States, the approval
of an FIE involves numerous meetings with PRC authorities, who will
make specific and detailed demands. A major concern of the PRC approval
authorities is that the FIE must have sufficient capital in order to operate as
a going concern. For this reason, PRC authorities will often insist on
injections of capital in the millions or tens of millions of dollars as a
condition of approval.80
A second, and perhaps even greater concern, is risk created by the
transfer of technology to the FIE. Once the IP is registered in its name, the
FIE is the legal owner of the technology in China, not the MNC.81 In cases
where the FIE is a joint venture, the local Chinese partner becomes a partial
owner of the IP in proportion to the equity ownership of the local partner in
the joint venture.82 Even where the MNC is the sole owner of the FIE as in
the case of a WFOE, the FIE is a separate legal person. The FIE is a

77

This is the author’s own elaboration and explanation of arguments by U.S. companies.
Setting up an FIE consumes a great deal of senior management time and involves many layers of
government approval. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 5, at 489–94.
79
See id. at 493.
80
This observation is based on the author’s own working experience as in-house counsel for a
multinational company in China. The author attended a number of meetings with PRC approval
authorities in which PRC officials made specific requests concerning capital requirements in connection
with several joint ventures that the multinational company was in the process of establishing. PRC
officials want to ensure that the new business entity will be successful and so will insist on an injection
of sufficient capital to allow the entity to meet all of its operational needs. If anything, PRC officials err
on the side of requiring more capital, rather than less. From the author’s own experience there are
numerous joint ventures in China with capital requirements of tens of millions of dollars.
81
See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321.
82
See id. If the local joint venture partner owns 40% of the equity of the joint venture, the joint
venture partner owns 40% of the joint venture’s assets, including the intellectual property rights. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企
业法) [Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001), art 4, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/214773.htm.
78
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Chinese legal entity with its own management. While the management of a
wholly-owned entity will usually follow instructions from the parent
company, there can be cases where disagreement and conflict arise between
parent and subsidiary.83 The FIE, even where it is a WFOE, can legally
transfer the IP rights without the consent of the parent since the FIE is the
legal owner of the IP rights in China and the parent has no ability to stop
such a transfer because it has relinquished ownership rights to the FIE.84
The FIE might lose the IP rights for other reasons, such as insolvency, debt,
or a hostile merger and acquisition.85 The risk is that as soon as the IP is in
the name of the FIE, not in the name of the U.S. company, the IP can be
transferred, assigned, or lost without any control by the U.S. company.86
This type of risk is why all MNCs that do business in China (or in any
other country) will insist on registering the IP in their own names in the
foreign country so that they remain the legal owners and can then license
the IP to their own subsidiaries or joint ventures.87
A third and related risk is misappropriation or theft. If the U.S.
company must transfer its IP rights to a Chinese legal entity, then the IP
rights might become exposed to misappropriation, theft, or counterfeiting.88
Theft of IP rights is always a risk in China but under PRC law, generally
only the registered owner of the IP right can bring an enforcement action.89
Since the FIE is technically the legal owner, not the U.S. company, only the
FIE can bring an enforcement action, such as a lawsuit or an administrative
action.90 Again, even where the FIE is a wholly-owned entity of the MNC,
83

See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321.
See id. As the registered owner of the patent, the FIE has authority to assign the patent to a new
owner. If the U.S. parent company has an agreement with the FIE that the FIE will not assign the
patent, the agreement creates a contract right, not an intellectual property right. If the FIE assigns the
patent in disregard of the agreement, the U.S. parent may have a breach of contract claim against the
FIE, but the assignment is still legally valid, and the U.S. parent still lacks the direct right to enforce the
patent.
85
See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321.
86
Id.
87
Id. If the U.S. company is the licensor of the IP rights and the foreign subsidiary is the licensee,
the subsidiary has no authority to transfer any intellectual property rights. The license can provide that
in the event of such intervening events, such as insolvency, the license will terminate, leaving the parent
company as the owner of the IP rights. Id. at 320–22.
88
Counterfeiting and commercial piracy are considered to be serious business problems in China.
Id. at 375.
89
For example, only the registered trademark owner can bring a trademark enforcement action.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (华人民共和国商标法) [Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008,
effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 53, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=131395.
90
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 76, art. 60 (“If a dispute arises as a
result of exploitation of a patent without permission of the patentee, that is, the patent right of the
patentee is infringed, the dispute shall be settled through consultation between the parties. If the parties
are not willing to consult or if consultation fails, the patentee or interested party may take legal action
before a people’s court, and may also request the administration department for patent-related work to
84
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the MNC is unable to take any action on its own to protect the IP rights,
and it must rely on the FIE.91 Thus, once the IP rights are registered in the
name of the FIE, the U.S. company has lost the ability to exercise direct
control over how the rights are to be protected.92 The exposure of IP rights
to misappropriation and theft once the rights are transferred to the FIE is
what U.S. companies mean when they claim that China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policies are designed to allow China to “steal” their IP rights.93
An additional risk is that once Chinese entities obtain technology
transferred from U.S. IP owners, these entities will use the technology to
compete with the U.S. IP owners in China and in other countries.94 China
will use the advanced technology to improve its own international
competitiveness and may eventually leapfrog the innovator of the
technology.95 In other words, U.S. companies fear that they are giving
China the very tools to overtake them in the global economy, a concern that
many observers believe has already been realized in practice.96
MNCs view the many risks attendant in meeting the requirements set
forth under China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies to qualify for
accreditation as serious barriers.97 Few U.S. companies are likely willing
to undertake the time, to expend the resources, and to incur the risks
involved in undergoing the process described above to qualify for

handle the dispute.”).
91
The U.S. company might enter into an agreement under which the FIE will enforce all IP rights
on behalf of the parent, but if the FIE refuses to enforce the rights for any reason, the U.S. company will
have only a breach of contract action against the FIE. Since the IP rights are in the name of the FIE as
the owner, the U.S. company has no legal interest in the rights and would still be unable to directly
enforce the IP rights. See id. This is the basic shortcoming of relying on an FIE to enforce the IP rights
of a U.S. parent company.
92
The U.S. company is faced with a dilemma here. If the U.S. company wants to be able to
directly enforce its IP rights, it must register the IP right in its own name. However, registering the IP
right in its own name will disqualify the U.S. company from receiving accreditation for government
procurement. In order to receive accreditation, the U.S. company must allow the FIE, a Chinese legal
entity, to register the IP right. This forces the U.S. company to lose direct control over how the IP
rights are enforced.
93
See Geithner, supra note 64 (quoting U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner as saying: “We’re seeing
China continue to be very, very aggressive in a strategy they started several decades ago, which goes
like this: you want to sell to our country, we want you to come produce here . . . if you want to come
produce here, you need to transfer your technology to us.”).
94
See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-1 (“[F]oreign businesses have reportedly been pressured to
transfer know-how and technology to Chinese firms in order to gain access to the Chinese market.
Businesses are concerned that this IP ultimately will be used by Chinese companies competing against
them in China and in third-country markets.”).
95
This concern is a valid one but it may be too late to prevent the consequences discussed above.
In fact, China has used technology obtained from foreign technology transfers to transform itself from
an agrarian-based economy into an industrial power in the span of just a few decades. See CHOW &
LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 15.
96
See id.
97
See supra Part II.B.
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accreditation.98 As a result, U.S. companies risk being shut out of the
lucrative government procurement in China while Chinese companies have
the option of selling to U.S. states in local government procurement.99
Many U.S. companies believe that this situation is unfair and some argue
that it is illegal under the WTO.100
III. ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO
Rather than undertaking the risks of qualifying their products for
government procurement as discussed above, U.S. companies have chosen
to pressure China to change its Indigenous Innovation Policies.101 Several
of these critics contend that China has failed to fulfill its WTO obligations
contained in the WTO Agreements and in China’s Protocol of
Accession.102 Critics argue that the United States government should file a
case against China in the WTO dispute settlement system unless China
withdraws or modifies its government procurement policies to allow equal
access by U.S. companies.103 This part of the Article examines the merits
of these arguments and this strategy in detail, and shows that the Chinese
government is not required under WTO undertakings to change its
procurement policies.

98
“[A]s of September 2010, a number of provincial indigenous innovation catalogues are in
effect . . . . There are almost no products made by foreign companies in these catalogues, a pattern that
seemingly excludes foreign companies from provincial government procurement markets unless there is
no Chinese-made alternative to a foreign product . . . . For example, only two of the 523 products in
Shanghai’s catalogue were made by FIEs, both of which have majority Chinese ownership; Jiangxi’s
475-product catalogue includes only one from an FIE; and Beijing’s government procurement
catalogues include only one foreign product out of 56 listed.” ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-12.
99
See Barboza, supra note 21, at A-1, A-4 (describing the California and New York state purchase
of massive infrastructure projects from China).
100
See infra Part III.
101
See Paul Eckert, Lawmakers Urge Firm Line on China in Bilateral Talks, REUTERS, July 9,
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-usa-china-congress-idUSBRE9681AM
20130709 (“Among the Chinese practices the lawmakers said required more U.S. pressure to change
were ‘indigenous innovation’ policies that require foreigners to transfer technology to China in order to
sell into the market . . . .”).
102
China’s Protocol of Accession is the legal document that effects China’s entry into the WTO and
that also creates binding WTO obligations on par with any of the WTO Agreements. See infra Part
III.B.
103
See, e.g., Chris Isidore, U.S. vs. China: The Trade Battles, CNN MONEY (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:03
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/13/news/international/china-trade/index.htm (“And while U.S.
businesses in a wide variety of industry sectors, from autos to technology to financial services, are
unusually vocal in complaining about this set of Chinese rules, they haven’t been challenged at the
WTO. ‘To me, that’s actually the biggest issue, more even than currency valuation,’ said David Joy,
chief market strategist for Ameriprise Financial. ‘Being forced to give up technology for access to the
market is essentially blackmail.’”). See also ATKINSON, supra note 64, at 76 (asserting the necessity of
a WTO resolution).
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A. The National Treatment Principle
The WTO sets forth the legal framework for trade and economic
relations among its member states in number 157, which, as of this writing,
includes all of the world’s major trading powers.104 The WTO contains
three major treaties which are mandatory and binding upon all members
upon accession to the WTO: (1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), governing the trade in goods; (2) the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), governing the trade in services; and (3) the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
governing the trade in technology or intellectual property.105 Together,
these three agreements, each administered by a WTO body dedicated to
each agreement, govern three of the four major channels of international
trade.106
For historical and political reasons, only foreign direct
investment, the fourth major channel of trade, is not covered by a WTO
agreement.107
A fourth major agreement, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), is also a mandatory agreement which governs the
resolution of disputes and creates an effective enforcement mechanism of
WTO obligations.108
One of the foundational principles of the WTO is the National
Treatment Principle, first enshrined in the GATT in 1947109 but now also
found in the GATS110 and TRIPS.111 GATT Article III provides in relevant
part:
Article III National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Treatment
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other
104

WTO Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
105
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 28.
106
See id.
107
See id. at 567, 570. An attempt was made to draft a general agreement, the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), but the MAI, drafted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development, based in Paris and comprised of advanced industrialized countries, failed to win
support due to unprecedented opposition by developing countries, which believed that their interests
were not represented. After the failure of the MAI, the priorities of the WTO shifted to other areas of
concern, such as agriculture and food security, environmental protection, and access to medicines.
There appears to be little political will to resuscitate any attempts to create a general agreement on
foreign investment. For a fuller discussion, see id. at 570.
108
See id. at 28.
109
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
110
See General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. II, XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183
[hereinafter GATS].
111
See Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 3–4, April 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products
in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production.
***
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.112
GATT Articles III:1 and III:4 set forth a principle of nondiscrimination against foreign imports, i.e., WTO members cannot impose
laws or regulations that discriminate in the purchase or sale of foreign
goods in favor of local goods, but must provide equal treatment to both
types of goods. The National Treatment Principle is a principle of nondiscrimination designed to prohibit countries from discriminating against
imports in favor of domestic products.113 The National Treatment Principle
does not depend on actual effects114: no discrimination in practice must be
proven; National Treatment requires equality in competitive conditions for
imports and local products.115
GATT Article III:1 and III:4, however, are limited by an explicit
exception contained in GATT Article III:8, which provides as follows:
8(a). The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws,
regulations, or requirements governing the procurement by
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view
to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.116
The combination of the provisions of GATT Article III set forth above
shows that the National Treatment Principle is a broad principle of nondiscrimination. The principle prohibits WTO members from discriminating
112
113
114
115
116

GATT, supra note 109, art. III.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 142.
See id. at 143.
See GATT, supra note 109, art. III:8(a).
Id.
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against foreign goods in favor of domestic products, but it does not apply to
government procurement.117 In the area of government procurement,
Article III:8(a) creates an exception to National Treatment; Article III:8(a)
makes clear that nothing in the GATT prevents WTO members from
discriminating against imports in favor of domestic goods in government
procurement.118 When the GATT was originally drafted in 1947, the
drafters believed that it was important to exempt government procurement
from the National Treatment Principle in recognition of the importance to
many countries of buying goods from domestic suppliers in order to
support their own economies.119 Due to the same policies and concerns, a
similar provision in GATS also exempts government procurement of
services from the National Treatment principle.120 Thus, under the GATT,
which applies to trade in goods, and the GATS, which applies to trade in
services, WTO members are free to discriminate against foreign goods and
services in favor of domestic goods and services in government
procurement.121
After the original GATT came into effect in 1947, government
procurement became an increasingly important part of international trade
and an effort was made to adopt some standards to prevent discrimination
in government procurement of foreign goods.122 An agreement on
government procurement, requiring National Treatment as applied to goods
117
118
119
120

Id.
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173.
See id.
GATS art. XVII provides in relevant part:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers
of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.

See GATS art. XVII. GATS Article XIII(1) states in relevant part:
1. Article . . . XVII shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes
and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services
for commercial sale.
2. There shall be multilateral negotiations on government procurement in services under
this Agreement within two years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement.
See also GATS art. XIII(1).
121
See GATT, supra note 109, art. III; GATS, supra note 110, arts. II, XVII.
122
See id.
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only, was negotiated during the Tokyo Round and entered into force on
January 1, 1981.123 The Tokyo Agreement, like all subsequent agreements
on government procurement, was binding only on countries that chose to
join the agreement.124 The Tokyo Agreement was narrow in scope and
coverage125 and negotiations were conducted during the Uruguay Round,
begun in 1986, to greatly expand it.126 At the end of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations, which led to the establishment of the WTO, the Government
Procurement Agreement was adopted in 1994 and recently a new GPA was
adopted in 2011 (2011 GPA).127 Article IV of the 2011 GPA provides:
Article IV: Non-Discrimination
1. With respect to any measure regarding covered procurement,
each Party, including the procuring entities, shall accord
immediately and unconditionally to the goods and services of any
other Party and to the suppliers of any other Party offering the
goods or services of any Party, treatment no less favourable than
the treatment the Party, including its procuring entities, accords
to:
(a) domestic goods, services and suppliers; and
(b) goods services and suppliers of any other Party.128
123

Plurilaterals: Of Minority Interest, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm#govt (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
124
See id.
125
The Tokyo Agreement applied only to national entities and to tendering procedures for the
purchase of goods. The present agreement achieves a tenfold expansion in coverage, which now
includes sub-national government entities and trade in services. See id.
126
See id.
127
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 174. The 2011
GPA expands the number of central and sub-central government entities as well as government owned
enterprises that are covered by GPA commitments and adds over fifty new categories of services. The
2011 GPA was also designed to expedite accession of new members, such as China. See id. at 173–74.
128
See Comm. on Gov’t Procurement, Decision on the Outcomes of the Negotiations Under Article
XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex to the Protocol Amending the Agreement
on Government Procurement, art. IV, WTO Doc. No. GPA/113 (Apr. 2, 2012). The full text of the
2011 GPA is contained in the Annex to the Protocol amending the Agreement on Government
Procurement, which is attached to the March 2012 Decision. Under paragraph 2 of the March 2012
Decision, the Protocol Amending the 1994 Government Procurement Agreement—that is, the 2011
GPA—will enter into force on the 30th day following deposits of acceptance of the Protocol by two
thirds of the Parties to the 1994 GPA. So far the EU, the United States, Hong Kong/China, the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Canada, Norway, and Liechtenstein have
deposited instruments of acceptance of the Protocol. As there are 15 parties to the GPA, the 2011 GPA
will come into effect when 3 more parties deposit their instruments of acceptance. The deposits are
considered a formality since all members of the GPA have already agreed to adopt the 2011 GPA, and
the March 12 Decision “means that all elements of the re-negotiations have now been agreed and that
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The result of Article IV:(1)(a) of the 2011 GPA is that it removes the
exception for government procurement contained in GATT Article III:8(a)
for members of the GPA because all GPA members must extend nondiscriminatory treatment in government procurement of goods and services
from foreign vendors from other GPA countries. In purchasing goods and
services, governments of GPA members must provide to foreign goods and
services from other GPA countries “treatment no less favourable than the
treatment the Party . . . accords to . . . domestic goods, services, and
suppliers.”129 This treatment has been interpreted to mean equality in the
conditions of competition such as equality in the bidding conditions by
domestic and foreign suppliers for government contracts and in the award
of government contracts.130 No GPA member can discriminate in favor of
its own domestic vendors of goods or services and against goods or
services from other members of the GPA.131
Note that members of the GPA are required to apply this obligation of
non-discrimination only to goods and services from other GPA members.132
Article IV:1(b) of the 2011 GPA requires that the GPA signatories
(including the United States) “shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to the goods and services of any other Party . . . treatment
no less favorable than the treatment the Party . . . accords to . . . goods,
services and suppliers of any other Party.”133 “[O]ther Party” refers to
other parties of the GPA, so all GPA members are entitled to receive
treatment equivalent to that afforded to any “other party” of the GPA.134 In
other words, the United States is required to extend non-discriminatory
treatment in government procurement to other GPA members, but it is not
required to provide non-discriminatory treatment in government
procurement to China or any other member of the WTO that is not a
member of the GPA. The United States has implemented a set of federal
laws that prohibit government procurement from any country that is not a
member of the GPA.135 However, this prohibition applies only to the
federal government or entities using federal funds. States are free to use
state funds to purchase goods and services from China.136 Some states,
the revised Agreement can enter into force subject to the submission of instruments of acceptance by
GPA Parties.” Id.
129
Id. art. IV:1(a)–(b).
130
Id. art. IV (Non-Discrimination), art. VIII (Conditions for Participation), art. IX (Qualification
of Suppliers); art. XIII (Limited Tendering); art. XV (Treatment of Tenders and Awarding of
Contracts).
131
Id. art. IV:1(a)–(b).
132
Id. art. IV:1(b).
133
Id. (emphasis added).
134
See supra note 128.
135
See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–2518 (2006), §§ 301, 302, 308.
136
See, e.g., Richard Gonzales, California Turns to China for New Bay Bridge, NPR (Sept. 16,
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such as New York and California, have purchased billions of dollars of
public works from China.137 This scheme suggests that China is able to
benefit from government procurement from the United States at the state
level, but that China discriminates at all levels, both central and local,
against all U.S. vendors in its government procurement. Some view this
relationship as non-reciprocal and unfair to the United States.138
While China’s discriminatory government procurement policies would
violate the GPA if China were a member of the GPA, China is not a
member and has no obligation to join the GPA. Unlike the GATT, GATS,
TRIPS, and the DSU, which are automatically binding on all WTO
members upon accession to the WTO, the GPA is a “plurilateral”
agreement, which means that it is voluntary.139 As of this writing, there are
fifteen members of the GPA composed of forty-two WTO members (the
EU has joined on behalf of its twenty-seven member states) and virtually
all are developed countries.140 Since the WTO has 157 member states, the
bulk of the WTO are not members of the GPA, and most of these states are
developing countries. It is important to note that even those states that are
members of the GPA are allowed to exclude certain government entities
from GPA obligations, and excluded government entities are free to
discriminate in favor of domestic goods.141 As we shall see, the ability of
GPA members to exclude government entities from the GPA is an
important element in the current controversy between the United States and
China.142
While China is not currently a member of the GPA, China has been
negotiating with GPA members, led by the United States and the European

2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/16/140515737/california-turns-to-china-for-new-bay-bridge. State
actions like these do not mean, however, that the federal government has not attempted to emphasize its
desire to curtail U.S. spending in China by states. See China Fair Trade Act of 2012, S. 3449, 112th
Congress (2d Sess. 2012).
137
See Barboza, supra note 21, at A1.
138
Pointing out the non-reciprocal relationship in government procurement between the United
States and China, recent presidential candidate Mitt Romney vowed to discontinue all government
procurement from China until China joined the GPA. See Mitt Romney Wants Reciprocity with China
When It Comes to Government Procurement, ALLIANCE FOR AM. MFG. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://americanmanufacturing.org/blog/mitt-romney-wants-reciprocity-china-when-it-comesgovernment-procurement.
139
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173. No nation is
required to join the GPA. Nations that join do so when they believe that it is in their own economic
interests. For official WTO site and explanation, see Overview of the Government Procurement
Agreement, supra note 29.
140
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173.
141
See id. The new 2011 GPA is a major advancement because GPA members have committed to
include many new government entities within the scope of GPA obligations.
142
See infra note 212 and accompanying text. The ability to exclude government entities from
GPA commitments is consistent with the voluntary nature of the GPA. WTO members can choose to
join the GPA on terms and conditions as they determine.
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Union, for accession to the GPA for several years.143 Yet, the prospects for
China’s accession in the immediate future appear to be dim.144 Recently,
the United States opposed China’s offer of accession to the GPA on the
grounds that China’s offer excluded too many government entities from
GPA obligations.145
B. Arguments That China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies Violate
WTO Obligations
Although China is not a member of the GPA and is not bound to
extend National Treatment to foreign goods in government procurement, a
number of critics have argued that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies
violate other WTO obligations.146 These obligations can be divided into
two groups: procedural and substantive obligations.
1. Violations of Procedural Obligations
The WTO contains a number of provisions requiring transparency, a
basic principle of the WTO contained in GATT X. Article X:1 requires the
prompt publication of laws, regulations, and administrative rulings that
affect the sale and distribution of goods in a manner that will enable
governments to become familiar with them.147 GATT Article X:2 further
143

Since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, China has made four offers to join the GPA, but
GPA members have rejected all of these offers. An “offer” includes a schedule of which Chinese
government entities will be bound by the GPA and the volume of trade that will be subject to the GPA.
China has a history of making offers that are limited in scope and coverage. If China’s offer is accepted
by other GPA members, then China is entitled to the full benefits of the much more expansive
schedules of the United States and the European Union. The European Union was very critical of
China’s latest offer. See Terrill Yue Jones, Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement
Agreement “Highly Disappointing,” REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50G720121206.
144
See China Announces Next Step in Joining Government Procurement Agreement, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (July 18, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/gpro_18jul12_e.htm.
145
See Paul Eckert, China Agreements to Currency, Procurement Reforms in Talks with U.S.,
REUTERS, July 12, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/12/us-usa-chinaeconomy-idUSBRE96B0MI20130712 (noting that China’s recent bid in 2012 did not pass muster with
the United States).
146
See, e.g., An & Peck, supra note 49.
147
GATT Article X:1 provides in relevant part:
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application
made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation
of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of
payments therefor, of affecting their sale, distribution . . . shall be published promptly in
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them.
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requires that countries should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire
information about such measures in order to protect and adjust their
interests or to seek modification of such measures.148
An additional set of transparency obligations are contained in China’s
Protocol of Accession.149 The Working Party Report, leading up to China’s
Protocol of Accession, states that China’s laws, regulations, and
administrative rulings must be made available to the public.150 The
Protocol of Accession states that with respect to laws, regulations, and
other measures affecting the trade in goods, WTO members are to be
allowed a “reasonable period for comment to the appropriate authorities
before such measures are implemented.”151 The Working Party Report
requires that China “make available to WTO Members translations into one
or more of the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and
other measures . . . affecting the trade in goods . . . in no case later than 90
days after they were implemented or enforced.”152
A related transparency argument is that China may also be in possible
violation of GATT Article X:3(a) requiring the uniform, impartial, and
reasonable administration of laws and regulations pertaining to the trade in
goods.153 Part I.2(A) of China’s Protocol of Accession also contains a
requirement that “China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner” laws and regulations pertaining to the trade in
goods.154 A related transparency argument is that China may also be in
possible violation of GATT Article X:3(a) requiring the uniform, impartial,
and reasonable administration of laws and regulations pertaining to the
trade in goods.155 Part I.2(A) of China’s Protocol of Accession also
See GATT, supra note 109, art. X:1.
148
GATT Article X:2 provides in relevant part:
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance
in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established an uniform practice, or
imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports,
or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been
officially published.
See id. art. X:2.
149
See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part I.4(C).
150
See Working Party on the Accession of China, Working Party Report on the Accession of China,
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001), ¶ 339, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/apcity/unpan002144.pdf [hereinafter Working Party Report].
151
China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(C)(1)–(2).
152
See Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶ 334.
153
GATT Article X:3(a) provides in relevant part: “Each contracting party shall administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner of its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind
described in paragraph 1 of this Article.” See GATT, supra note 109, art. X:3(a).
154
See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(A)(2).
155
GATT Article X:3(a) provides in relevant part: “Each contracting party shall administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner of its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind
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contains a requirement that “China shall apply and administer in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner” laws and regulations pertaining to the
trade in goods.156 These two provisions require the administration of laws
in a transparent manner and many argue that China applies its accreditation
policies through internal processes that are not made publically available.157
Critics contend that the publication of China’s policies related to the
accreditation measures under the Indigenous Innovation Policies failed to
satisfy these transparency obligations in a number of ways, including the
failure to offer a period for comment and the failure by China to provide
translations from Chinese into English or another one of the official
languages of the WTO.158 Several foreign industries claim that China does
not administer measures implementing China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policies and its Protocol of Accession in an impartial or uniform manner
but does so in a haphazard, unpredictable, and non-transparent fashion.159
These merits of the arguments that China has violated its WTO
transparency obligations depend on a number of technical distinctions and
arguments that are too detailed to discuss in depth here, including whether
China’s policies are the types of measures that are subject to transparency
and uniform administration requirements.160 But these arguments are not to
the point. Assuming that China’s measures implementing its policies are
subject to and constitute violations of the WTO provisions related to
transparency and uniform administration, what are the consequences for
China?
In any dispute between WTO members, the ultimate goal of dispute
settlement, whether through informal mediation or through the formal
litigation process of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, is for an offending
member to bring its non-complying measures into compliance with its
WTO obligations.161 Alternatively, the parties may reach a mutually
satisfactory solution.162 This basic approach is set forth in the DSU and is
described in paragraph 1 of this Article.” See GATT supra note 109, art. X:3(a).
156
See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(A)(2).
157
See Kathrin Hill, European Companies Attack Chinese Procurement Policy, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Eng.), Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/94e9b5c4-6af6-11e0-9744-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2GRfv55VN (criticizing local governments and state owned enterprises for setting procurement
policies in a non-transparent way).
158
See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 413.
159
See, e.g., Coalition of Services Industries, Industry Comments on the Draft Notice Launching the
National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010, TIA (May 10, 2010),
http://www.tiaonline.org/sites/default/files/pages/FINALMultiAssocNIIPComments05-07-2010English.pdf.
160
For example, whether China has met the transparency requirements of GATT Article X:1
depends on whether China’s measures fall within the scope of GATT Article X:1 relating to sale and
distribution and whether the measures have met the timing requirement of GATT Article X:1 that the
measures be published in a timely manner so as to allow governments and traders to become acquainted
with them. These are very technical issues. See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 406–14.
161
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 67.
162
See id.
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an accepted norm and expectation within the WTO system.163 As
compliance or mutual agreement is the ultimate goal of the dispute
settlement system, if China is in violation of these provisions, China would
need to cure its deficiencies by meeting transparency requirements (such as
by publishing translations) and by administering its Indigenous Innovation
Policies in a uniform, impartial, and transparent manner. In other words,
the remedy for non-transparency is creating transparency.
China’s transparent administration of its Indigenous Innovation
Policies, of course, would create important benefits. U.S. vendors would
benefit from greater transparency in understanding the accreditation
process and the workings of the central and sub-central entities involved in
government procurement; the United States would also benefit from greater
transparency in negotiating with China for future changes.164 While these
benefits may accrue, China is not required, even assuming that these claims
are proven in a WTO dispute settlement case, to change the substantial
content of its policies. Furthermore, China is most certainly not required to
join the GPA. In other words, the argument that China has violated its
procedural obligations relating to transparency may result in China’s
correction of those procedural irregularities, but it will not affect the
substantial content of any of China’s current existing government
procurement policies. At this time, one has to wonder why such a
challenge would be brought in a case, or even raised with China informally,
as the result will not achieve what U.S. industries really desire: the
withdrawal of the policies and China’s entry into the GPA. To the
contrary, if the United States were to bring a formal challenge against
China for procedural violations, such a case could antagonize China and
might only harden China’s stance.165
2. Violations of Substantive Obligations

163

For example, Article 22.8 of the WTO DSU provides in relevant part:
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall be
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings
provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually
satisfactory solution is reached.

See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU].
164
The author is indebted to Professor Timothy Webster for pointing out the benefits of
transparency.
165
No country, including the United States, likes being sued in the WTO and having to defend itself
against an accusation that it is not living up to its WTO obligations. Most countries are likely to view
being sued as an unfriendly act.
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Apart from possibilities of procedural violations, critics have made a
number of arguments that China’s government procurement policies violate
China’s substantive obligations under the WTO.166 Although a number of
arguments have been raised,167 the discussion below focuses on arguments
that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies violate commitments in TRIPS
and in its Protocol of Accession.
a. TRIPS
So far we have examined the National Treatment Principle contained
in GATT Article III and the exceptions for government procurement. As
noted earlier, the National Treatment Principle is also contained in TRIPS,
which governs trade in technology. Do China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policies, which relate to technology trade, violate the TRIPS National
Treatment Principle? Article 3 of TRIPS provides in relevant part:
Each member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to
exceptions [in existing IP treaties not relevant here].168
The language of TRIPS Article 3 refers to “treatment . . . with regard
to the protection” of intellectual property.169 TRIPS further explains that
“‘protection’ shall include matters affecting the availability, acquisition,
scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well
as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically
addressed in this Agreement.”170
As an example of a violation of TRIPS Article 3, the United States
required Cuban nationals who owned certain registered U.S. trademarks to
undertake an additional procedural step to protect their U.S. trademarks in
U.S. courts, a step that U.S. nationals are not required to take to protect
their trademarks.171 Cuban nationals, including state owned companies,
166

See, e.g., An & Peck, supra note 49, at 423–42.
See id.
168
TRIPS, supra note 111, art. 3.
169
Id. (emphasis added).
170
See id. n.3.
171
See Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, ¶¶ 277–281,
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations]. This case arose in the context of a French-Cuban joint venture that sought to enforce
the trademark rights to “Havana Rum,” a trademark that had been confiscated from the Arechabala
family in Cuba by the Cuban government. The Cuban government then assigned the confiscated
trademark to a Cuban state-owned company, which then registered the “Havana Rum” trademark in the
United States and later formed a joint venture with a French company. Bacardi, a U.S. company, had
purchased any rights to the trademark from the Arechabalas, who had moved to Spain. Bacardi and
167
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who sought to enforce U.S. registrations of trademarks based upon the
same or a similar Cuban trademark were required to demonstrate that they
had the permission of the original trademark owner whose trademark had
been confiscated by the Cuban government.172 Nationals of the United
States and all other WTO countries were not required to prove consent of
the owner of the original Cuban trademark.173 The purpose of this law was
to prevent the Castro government from expropriating private businesses
and their trademarks and then using the trademarks in U.S. commerce.174
Under these facts, the WTO Appellate Body held that the applicable U.S.
law violates the National Treatment Principle contained in TRIPS, since the
law imposed more onerous conditions on Cuban nationals than on U.S.
nationals.175 Or suppose that Country A imposed more restrictive
administrative requirements and higher fees for the filing of patent
applications by foreign nationals than for applications filed by its own
nationals. This type of requirement would also violate the National
Principle contained in TRIPS.176 China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies,
however, do not relate to the protection of IP rights.177 The policies
contain a requirement that Chinese government entities purchase products
with technology owned by Chinese legal enterprises.178 This is a policy
that relates to the purchase of goods, which is within the scope of the
GATT relating to goods,179 but falls outside of the scope of Article 3 of
TRIPS, which relates to the protection of intellectual property.180
b. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Cuban interests in the United States lobbied the U.S. Congress to pass legislation that would block the
French-Cuban venture from enforcing trademark rights to “Havana Rum.” As a result, Congress passed
Section 211, which required Cuban nationals asserting trademark rights in a trademark that had been
confiscated from the original owners by the Cuban government to demonstrate that they had the
approval of the original owner of the trademark. U.S. nationals asserting trademark rights that had been
confiscated from the original owners by the Cuban government did not have to demonstrate that they
had acquired consent from the original trademark owners. This discriminatory treatment—which
imposed an additional procedural hurdle on Cuban nationals, but not on U.S. nationals—violated the
National Treatment Principle.
172
See id. ¶¶ 276–277.
173
See id.
174
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at XX.
175
See Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, supra note 171, ¶ 280.
176
See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 257.
177
See Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, supra note 171, ¶ 243 (finding that the Article 3
National Treatment Principle of TRIPS requires “WTO Members to accord no less favorable treatment
to non-nationals than to nationals in the ‘protection’ of trade-related intellectual property rights”)
(emphasis added).
178
See supra notes 42–48.
179
The procurement of goods by governmental agencies is explicitly excepted from the National
Treatment Principle under GATT Article III:8(a). See GATT, supra note 109, art. III.
180
For a definition of “protection,” see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
supra note 10.
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Measures
Some have argued that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies result
in the granting of illegal subsidies and must be withdrawn.181 A subsidy is
a financial contribution by a government182 that is specific to an enterprise,
industry, or group of enterprises or industries.183 A subsidy distorts trade
because the financial contribution provides a cost advantage that can be
passed on by the recipient industry in the form of lower prices to
consumers in the home country.184 If the enterprise or industry exports the
goods, then the subsidy allows the exporter to charge a lower price in the
export market, harming industries in the export market.185 If an illegal
subsidy exists, an aggrieved WTO member state can directly challenge the
subsidy with the WTO.186 If the WTO dispute settlement body finds that
an illegal subsidy exists, the WTO will recommend that the nation
providing the subsidy withdraw the measure without delay.187
Certain types of subsidies are deemed prohibited or illegal per se.188
In the case of prohibited subsides, as opposed to all other types of
subsidies, the aggrieved state does not need to prove any harm caused;189
the existence of the prohibited subsidy alone is sufficient to require its
withdrawal.190 Among the category of prohibited subsidies are “subsidies
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the
use of domestic over imported goods.”191 The argument is that China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies provide a prohibited subsidy to Chinese
enterprises by requiring Chinese governmental entities to purchase
domestic goods over imported goods.192
181
I am indebted to Professors Juscelino Colares and Timothy Webster for pointing out this
argument.
182
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
183
See id. art. 2.1.
184
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 494–95.
185
See id.
186
In a case where a domestic industry exports subsidized goods to the United States, the United
States is also allowed to impose a “countervailing duty,” i.e., an additional tariff, equal to the amount of
the subsidy to offset its effects. This is a unilateral remedy. If the recipient of the subsidy does not
export any products, then the only remedy available is to bring an action with the WTO seeking the
withdrawal of the measure. See id. at 493.
187
See SCM Agreement, supra note 182, art. 4.7.
188
See id. art. 3.
189
All other subsidies are actionable subsidies. See id. Part III. To be illegal, an actionable subsidy
must result in “adverse effects to the interests of other Members.” See id. art. 5.
190
See id. arts. 3–4.
191
Id. art. 3.1(b).
192
The purchase of goods by the Chinese government is a payment to a Chinese enterprise and is
“contingent” upon the purchase of the Chinese goods in place of a foreign made good. This falls within
the definition under SCM Article 3.1(b) of a subsidy that is contingent upon the purchase of a domestic
good over imported goods.
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Subsidies are a complex issue under the WTO and a full analysis of
whether China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies constitute subsidies would
require an extended study, which is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
also notoriously difficult to predict the outcome of complex litigation with
the WTO. For the sake of argument, assume that the United States is able
to successfully litigate this issue and obtain a decision from the WTO
requiring China to withdraw its Indigenous Innovation Policies as
prohibited subsidies. Note that nothing would prevent China from
implementing a different set of policies, outside the scope of any WTO
decision on its Indigenous Innovation Policies, which would achieve the
same result.193 For example, China could provide direct grants to Chinese
enterprises to spur research and development instead of buying products
from Chinese enterprises in place of imports.194 China could also
reformulate its policies so that they are outside the bounds of any WTO
decision rejecting its Indigenous Innovation Policies.195 The United States
would have to file a new case challenging China’s new policies and spend
three to five years preparing and litigating the case to a successful outcome
in the WTO.196 Meanwhile, China will reap the benefits of these new
policies and can continue the cycle of litigation and issuance of new
policies indefinitely.
Further, obtaining a withdrawal of China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies will not achieve the result most desired by
the United States: China’s entry into the GPA. It is difficult to see how
requiring China to withdraw its policies will induce China to join the GPA,
193
The fundamental purpose of dispute settlement in the WTO is to bring non-conforming
measures enacted by a WTO member into compliance with the WTO. This means that if the panel or
the Appellate Body finds that a measure violates the WTO agreements, the panel or the Appellate Body
will recommend that the offending nation withdraw the measure. This is the extent of the role
performed by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 64–67. The WTO does not instruct its members on how to conduct their
own internal affairs. This would allow China or any other WTO member to adopt a different set of
measures that violate the same WTO obligations, but in a different manner. Chinese central authorities
could also issue oral demands, which is a common practice in China. Of course, such maneuvers would
be viewed rather dimly by other WTO members, but are not illegal.
194
Domestic subsidies, i.e., payments made by a government only to domestic industries but not to
foreign industries, are permitted under the GATT. GATT Article III:8(b) explicitly recognizes that the
National Treatment obligation set forth in Article III “shall not prevent the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers.” This GATT exception allows a country to make a direct payment
to a domestic industry without making a similar payment to a foreign industry. See Italian
Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Report of the GATT Panel, L/833-&S/60,
adopted on Oct. 23, 1958, ¶ 14.
195
See supra note 193.
196
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 69–70 (setting
forth a step-by-step schedule in U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline in which
the timeline is three to five years, depending on whether the case is measured by date of adoption of
contest legislation (five years) or date of commencement of the WTO dispute settlement process (two
years, seven months)); Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
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as GPA membership is purely voluntary. Such an action might have the
opposite effect of hardening China’s stance (because no nation likes to lose
in WTO litigation) and creating additional delays.
c. China’s Protocol of Accession
The issue of China’s joining the GPA arose during the negotiations of
China’s Protocol of Accession. The relevant paragraph in the Working
Party Report, which was incorporated into the Protocol of Accession, reads
in relevant part:
339. The representative of China stated that China intended to
become a Party to the GPA and that until such time, all
government entities at the central and sub-national level . . .
would conduct their procurement in a transparent manner, and
provide all foreign suppliers with equal opportunity to participate
in that procurement pursuant to the principle of MFN treatment.
341. The representative of China responded that China would
become an observer to the GPA upon accession to the WTO
Agreement and initiate negotiations for membership in the
GPA . . . as soon as possible.197
Critics have argued that this language stating that China intended to
join the GPA creates a legitimate expectation on the part of other WTO
members that China would not introduce additional discriminatory
measures that further disadvantaged foreign suppliers in government
procurement.198 In other words, China’s promise to join the GPA as soon
as possible was an implicit promise by China that, until its entry into the
GPA, it would maintain the status quo in government procurement rather
than creating further disadvantages for foreign suppliers.199 A line of WTO
decisions beginning with EEC - Oilseeds I200 and continuing with JapanPhotographic Film201 has considered cases in which a member is denied a
197

Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶¶ 339–341.
See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 423–33.
199
Id. at 427–28 (noting that “[o]ther members may derive a legitimate expectation from the
accession Protocol and the Working Party Report that China would not introduce additional
discriminatory measures affecting China’s government procurement market prior to its accession to the
GPA”).
200
Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Payments and Subsidies Paid to
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627 (Jan. 25, 1990),
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991) [hereinafter EEC - Oilseeds I].
201
Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, ¶ 10.61,
WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998) (Report of the Panel adopted on April 22, 1998) [hereinafter Japan—
Photographic Film].
198
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legitimate benefit derived from a justified expectation based upon an
understanding or agreement with another WTO member.202
If an
understanding or agreement was reached during negotiations involving a
trade concession between WTO members, the later withdrawal of the
understanding by the party making the promise might create harm to the
aggrieved party that is actionable under the WTO.
The legal standard under the WTO for bringing a cause of action is
where a legitimate benefit is “nullified or impaired”203 by a measure of the
offending nation. Such an action can give rise to a claim under GATT
Article XXIII:1(b), the original dispute settlement provision in the GATT,
although GATT Article XXIII has been supplemented by the DSU.204 The
argument is that China’s stated intentions of joining the GPA created a
legitimate expectation on the part of other WTO members that until its
entry into the GPA, China would not act in a way that is inconsistent with
the GPA or at least would not introduce additional discriminatory measures
202
203
204

EEC - Oilseeds I, supra note 200, ¶ 147.
GATT Article XXIII reproduced in full in the following note.
GATT Article XXIII Nullification and Impairment provides:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting
party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the recommendations or
proposals made to it.

GATT, supra note 109, art. XXIII. Article XXIII was the original provision providing for dispute
settlement. It has since been supplemented by the DSU, which set up a more elaborate dispute
settlement system. GATT Article XXIII has been incorporated into the DSU by DSU Article 3 so the
“nullification and impairment” standard is still the current legal standard under the DSU. The claim
that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies cause a nullification and impairment of a trade benefit
created by China’s Protocol of Accession is an example of a so-called “non-violation” case under
Article XXIII:1(b). A “violation” case under Article XXIII:1(a) involves the breach of a provision in a
WTO agreement. By contrast, a “non-violation” case does not violate the language of any provision of
a WTO agreement but otherwise undermines a benefit. In the case of China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policies, it is not possible to point to the language of a covered WTO agreement and show that China is
acting in violation of the provision. Rather, China has created certain legitimate expectations by the
language in its Protocol of Accession and is now defeating those expectations by the unexpected
issuance and implementation of the Indigenous Innovation Policies. No case has ever arisen under
Article XXIII:1(c) referring to the “existence of any other situation.”
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in government procurement prior to China’s entry into the GPA.205 This
agreement by China formed part of the conditions under which WTO
members agreed to allow China to accede to the WTO. China’s failure to
fulfil the legitimate expectations of other WTO members by enacting its
Indigenous Innovation Policies is a violation of a WTO obligation for
which a remedy is appropriate.
The complaining party bears the burden of proof to establish a
legitimate expectation of a benefit that has been nullified or impaired.206
The language of the Working Party Report itself states that until it joins the
GPA, China will provide foreign suppliers with “equal opportunity . . .
pursuant to the principle of MFN treatment.” MFN stands for “Most
Favored Nation” treatment, one of the two fundamental principles of the
GATT, along with National Treatment Principle, which were enshrined in
the original GATT 1947.207 MFN is a principle of equality, i.e., China will
treat all foreign suppliers equally and will not favor any single foreign
supplier or disadvantage any single foreign supplier;208 all foreign suppliers
from all countries will be given identical treatment. MFN should be
distinguished from National Treatment, which is also a principle of equality
that states that all foreign and domestic suppliers shall receive equal
treatment.209 It is perfectly possible to comply with MFN treatment and
still violate National Treatment. For example, suppose that China has a
rule that only domestic suppliers can receive accreditation for government
procurement purposes and that no foreign suppliers can receive
accreditation. This rule would violate National Treatment (assuming that
China was required to apply this principle) because the rule discriminates
in favor of domestic suppliers and against foreign suppliers. However, this
rule does not violate MFN so long as all foreign suppliers receive equal
treatment, i.e., all are denied accreditation. If China accredited some
foreign suppliers but refused to accredit others under the same conditions
then a possible MFN violation might have occurred.
It is also possible to violate National Treatment Principle without
violating MFN. Suppose that China prohibits discrimination in favor of
domestic goods and against foreign goods; but as among foreign goods,
certain goods receive preferences while others do not. This policy would
satisfy National Treatment Principle as domestic and foreign goods are
treated equally but would violate MFN because certain foreign goods
205

See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 427–28.
See Japan—Photographic Film, supra note 201, ¶ 10.32.
207
See supra note 109.
208
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 130.
209
The Most Favored National Principle requires that all foreign vendors from other WTO
members be given equal treatment. The National Treatment Principle requires that all foreign imports
be given treatment no less favorable than that given to domestic products. Thus, the Most Favored
Nation Treatment Principle is a principle of external non-discrimination whereas the National
Treatment Principle is a principle of internal non-discrimination. See id. at 129.
206
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receive better treatment than other foreign goods. In other words, while
both MFN and National Treatment Principle are principles of
discrimination, they have different targets. MFN is a principle of external
non-discrimination while National Treatment Principle is a principle of
international non-discrimination.210 It is possible to violate one without
violating the other. China’s statement that it intended to treat all foreign
suppliers equally under the MFN cannot be read to imply that China also
agreed to extend National Treatment to foreign suppliers. In fact, the
explicit reference to MFN accompanied with the omission of any reference
to National Treatment seems to support the opposite inference that China
was making no promises to accord National Treatment to foreign suppliers.
Another hurdle in establishing legitimate expectations by other WTO
members that China’s stated intention to join the WTO was an indication
that China would not institute additional discriminatory measures in
government procurement is created by the GPA itself.211 As noted earlier,
the GPA allows its members to declare exceptions, i.e., to exclude
designated government entities from the National Treatment of the GPA.212
These excluded entities are then free to discriminate in favor of local
products. If China is free to condition its accession to the GPA on
exceptions, it becomes more difficult to argue that China’s Protocol of
Accession created a promise that no additional conditions of discrimination
would be added prior to China’s accession to the GPA. Exclusions are
actually permitted by the GPA itself for developing countries.213
If the United States were to bring a case within the WTO alleging
China’s violation of its substantive obligations, the burden would be on the
United States to demonstrate that language in the Working Party Report
referring to MFN treatment in government procurement creates a legitimate
expectation of National Treatment or no additional discriminatory
measures inconsistent with National Treatment in government
procurement.214 The discussion above indicates that this might be a
difficult burden to meet. Even assuming that the United States can meet
this burden and show nullification and impairment, what relief would be
available to the United States? DSU Article 26.1 states that “where a
210

See id.
Each GPA member submits a schedule of covered government entities and goods and services
subject to the GPA. Any government entity or goods or services not on the schedule are not subject to
the obligations of the GPA. See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, supra note 29.
212
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173. The United
States objected to China’s offer to join the GPA in 2010 because China’s offer excluded too many
government entities. See Loretta Chao, China Reapplies to WTO Procurement Group, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704723604575378833136966648
(noting that China’s proposal falls far short of their requirements on several accounts since state owned
enterprises and provincial or local governments are excluded from the GPA by the proposal).
213
See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, supra note 29.
214
See Japan—Photographic Film, supra note 201, ¶ 10.32.
211
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measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits . . . there is no
obligation to withdraw the measure. The panel or Appellate Body shall
recommend the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory
adjustment.”215 The most important part of this provision is that even if
China’s measures related to its Indigenous Innovation Policies were found
to violate its obligations under the Protocol of Accession, China is not
required to repeal or withdraw them. China is to make a “mutually
satisfactory adjustment.”216 An adjustment that is mutually satisfactory
must be satisfactory to China; it is unclear how long this process is to take,
but achieving a result that is mutually satisfactory could result in long
delays or an indefinite stalemate.217 Moreover, it is difficult to see how
such a result would persuade China to withdraw its policies or expedite
China’s accession into the GPA.
C. China’s Incentive to Join the GPA
Before we examine how the controversy might be resolved going
forward, this part discusses why China might have little incentive to join
the GPA. Under current U.S. law, the U.S. federal government is
prohibited from procuring goods and services from non-GPA members,
including China.218 The states, however, can and do purchase goods and
services from China.219 If China joins the GPA, the U.S. federal
government will be required to open up its government procurement to
China and provide Chinese vendors with non-discriminatory treatment.
China may perceive, however, that it does not really stand to benefit in
its trading relationship with the United States even if China joins the GPA.

215

DSU, supra note 163, art. 26.1 (emphasis added).
Id.
217
China’s pattern of behavior indicates that China is not enthusiastic about joining the GPA.
China has made four offers, each rejected by the United States and the European Union. See Terril Yue
Jones, Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement Agreement “Highly Disappointing,”
REUTERS, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50
G720121206. The reasons for China’s lack of enthusiasm are discussed in Part III.C infra.
218
See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–18 (2006), §§ 301, 302, 308.
219
See supra note 21; see also Richard Gonzales, California Turns to China for New Bay Bridge,
NPR (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/16/140515737/california-turns-to-china-for-newbay-bridge; John W. Miller & Chuin-Wei Yap, U.S. Icons Now Made of Chinese Steel, WALL ST. J.
(June 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578545431938331880
(“The Verrazano-Narrows Bridge was a feat of American engineering when it was built across New
York’s harbor in the 1960s. Now, it’s being repaired with steel made in China.”); Keith Schneider,
Infusing
from
China
for
Toledo,
Ohio,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
24,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/realestate/commercial/riverfront-in-toledo-ohio-gets-infusionfrom-china.html?_r=1& (“There were a few letters and a few blogs that took issue with our selling
riverfront property to the Chinese or any foreign investor,” said Thomas S. Crothers, the deputy mayor
for external relations. “Our job, though, is to bring investment from domestic or foreign sources to
revitalize our community.”).
216
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China may believe that the U.S. government does not really intend to
purchase from China, and China already has access to government
procurement from the states.220 The U.S. government would be under
political pressure to forgo the purchase of goods and services from China
for several reasons. In 2011, the United States had a $301.5 billion trade
deficit with China.221 A trading nation (the United States) has a trade
deficit with a trading partner (China) when the trading nation buys more in
goods than it sells to its trading partner.222 A nation with a trade deficit
buys more than it earns from the trade in goods and is living beyond its
means, so its wealth will begin to shrink unless it can create economic
growth by other means such as by innovation in technology, by attracting
inward foreign direct investment, or by borrowing money.223 With its
revenues earned through sales to the United States, China is buying up U.S.
assets in the form of government securities, such as Treasury bonds, which
means that China owns more and more of the U.S. economy.224 The
negative consequences of a long term and expanding trade deficit with
China have drawn harsh criticism in Congress.225
Consequently, the U.S. government would likely come under severe
political pressure to forgo buying goods from China instead of adding to
the trade deficit. Even if China joins the GPA, the U.S. government might
find other means to prevent government procurement from China. For
example, under GATT Article XXI, a nation can refuse to follow a WTO
obligation if such action is “necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests [in an] emergency in international relations.”226 Recently,
the U.S. Congress issued a report declaring that two Chinese
telecommunications companies posed a threat to national security and
urged U.S. companies to find other vendors.227 The Chinese government
might view this action and the current political climate in the United States
as indications that even if China joins the GPA, the U.S. government is not

220
China may believe that even if it joins the GPA, the U.S. federal government will come under
intense political pressure to forgo buying goods and services from it due to the current hostile attitude
towards China in the U.S. Congress.
221
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 44.
222
See id. at 30. The 2011 figure quoted in the text above only refers to the trade in goods.
223
See id.
224
See id. at 44–48.
225
See Bucking Trend: U.S. Trade Gap Grows, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577516673966206002.html (quoting an
official from Congress’ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stating that China
engages in “predatory, protectionist, and unfair trade practices”).
226
See GATT, supra note 109, art. XXI (Security Exceptions).
227
See U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong.,
Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Interests Posed by Chinese Telecommunications
Companies Huawei and ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/
huawei.pdf.
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likely to award large contracts to Chinese vendors.228 This means that
China might perceive that it has little to gain from joining the GPA; the
U.S. government will find reasons to limit its purchase of goods and
services from China, and the states already buy from China. While China
has little to gain from joining the GPA, once China becomes a member,
China will be required to dismantle its Indigenous Innovation Policies,
which are crucial to attain China’s long term goals. In other words, China
may believe that the costs of joining the GPA far outweigh the benefits, if
any, of becoming a GPA member.
D. Resolving the Controversy Going Forward
The discussion and analysis of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies
that relate to government procurement makes clear several points that
should guide U.S. companies and the U.S. government going forward.
First, it is clear that few, if any, U.S. companies will be willing to meet the
conditions necessary to qualify their products for accreditation by Chinese
authorities for government procurement. Few, if any, U.S. companies are
likely to assign or sell their technology to an unaffiliated Chinese legal
enterprise. It is also unlikely that a U.S. company will undertake the timeconsuming and expensive process of setting up a Foreign-Invested
Enterprise to serve as the recipient of its technology. In light of these
realities, the claim by some U.S. companies that they are being “forced” to
transfer their technology to China where it will be “stolen”229 seems flatly
disingenuous. No one is forcing U.S. companies to look for opportunities
in China’s government procurement market.
Instead, many U.S.
companies do not see the options involving technology transfer described
above to qualify for accreditation as practicable or desirable. As a result,
U.S. companies will either attempt to qualify for accreditation despite the
risks or seek business opportunities elsewhere. This is a business decision
that U.S. companies will make after an assessment of the risks and rewards,
a process that U.S. companies undergo every day. If U.S. companies
decide to apply for accreditation, then they have decided to accept China’s
requirement that they transfer their technology to China. This is ultimately
a voluntary decision to accept business risks in pursuit of profits. Since
U.S. companies do not want to accept the risks associated with transferring
their technologies to China and also do not want to lose the opportunity to
sell to the Chinese government, U.S. companies, with the assistance of the
228
This observation is based upon the author’s own discussions with academics and lawyers in
China. Of course, the Chinese government would never express such sentiments in print.
229
See Hearing: China’s Five-Year Plan, Indigenous Innovation and Technology Transfers and
Outsourcing Before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011) (testimony of Adam
Segal, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/6.15.11Segal.pdf.
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U.S. government, are actively engaged in lobbying and pressuring China to
withdraw these policies and join the GPA.230
The legal arguments that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies
violate other procedural or substantive obligations under the WTO have
serious shortcomings, both on a doctrinal level and as a matter of political
strategy. Even if the United States were able to successfully litigate these
points in the WTO and force China to withdraw its current government
procurement policies, it still would not solve the crux of the problem facing
U.S. companies. What U.S. companies want is an equal opportunity to
compete for government purchases of goods and services under conditions
that do not favor Chinese goods and services. Even if China withdrew its
current policies, nothing prevents China from issuing other discriminatory
rules against foreign goods and services in government procurement.231
The only effective way to achieve the goal of equal access is to induce
China to join the GPA under meaningful conditions that make this possible,
i.e., without the use of broad exclusions of government entities that will
significantly weaken the impact of the GPA.232
In light of the complaints by the United States, China has made some
changes to its policies. In 2011, China announced that central level
authorities would no longer engage in accreditation of products for
government procurement.233 However, since 95% of all government
procurement in China occurs at the sub-central level, i.e., at the provincial
levels or lower,234 this change in policy is likely to have minimal effect on
China’s government procurement.235
Moreover, while central-level
authorities will no longer accredit products, it remains unclear whether the
central-level authorities will ultimately purchase goods and services from
U.S. vendors. China often makes changes in response to external pressure

230

See Hearing on President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda with U.S. Trade Representative Ron
Kirk, Second Panel on the Future of U.S. Trade Negotiations: Hearing before the Committee on Ways
and Means, 112th Cong. 112-22 (2012) (statement of Congressman Earl Blumenauer), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=318517.
231
While most WTO members would have dim views of such a sharp maneuver, it is legal under
the WTO. For example, in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8.AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), the Appellate Body made clear that panel reports “are not binding,
except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between parties to that dispute.” See Japan—
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra, at 14. In the view of the author, this would allow China to enact
a different set of laws that discriminate against goods and services from the United States because these
measures would trigger a new and different dispute.
232
Joining the GPA creates a positive obligation on the part of China to give non-discriminatory
treatment to U.S. goods and services in government procurement. See WTO Government Procurement
Agreement, supra note 28, art. III.
233
See 2013 WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 42.
234
Government Procurement Administrative Measures (P.R.C.) (2011), available at
http://www.ccgp.gov.cn.
235
The central government does not actually purchase large amounts of goods and services. The
provinces and municipalities account for 95% of government procurement. See id.
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that may appear to offer real concessions, but they are, in the end, cosmetic
changes that have little impact on the underlying problem.236 These modest
changes are not likely to have a significant effect on the implementation of
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and have not stemmed the flow of
criticism from U.S. politicians and U.S. companies about China’s
policies.237
In hindsight, it is now clear that an opportunity existed but was missed
during the negotiations for China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO.238
The United States, which assumed a leading role in the negotiations, made
a strategic error in obtaining a promise by China that it intended to join the
GPA instead of obtaining a binding commitment by China to join the GPA
by a certain deadline and under certain conditions.239 The United States
could also have negotiated China’s entry into the GPA simultaneously with
China’s accession to the WTO under the Protocol of Accession. Under this
scenario, China would have been bound by the mandatory disciplines of the
GATT, GATS, and TRIPS upon accession to the WTO and the GPA. Of
course, in retrospect, it is easy to point out this oversight. When China was
negotiating its entry into the WTO, China’s annual government
procurement budget was a fraction of what it is today. In the 1990s, it
would have been hard to foresee that China’s government procurement
budget would, by China’s own admission, grow ten-fold between 2002 to
2012 from $16 billion to $178 billion.240 Moreover, according to the
United States and the EU, China’s own estimates of its current government
procurement budget significantly understate the full amount of resources
that are currently available.241
The United States and other WTO countries had leverage during the
negotiations of the conditions of China’s accession to the WTO because
China wanted to accede to the WTO as expeditiously as possible,242 but this
236
If sub-central entities engage in 95% of all government procurement, a change in policy
affecting the central government, which engages in only 5% of government procurement is, in actuality,
a very minor concession.
237
The China Fair Trade Act, which was not enacted in 2011, has been reintroduced in Congress in
2012. The China Fair Trade Act prevents the use of federal funds to purchase Chinese goods and
services until China joins the Government Procurement Agreement. See China Fair Trade Act of 2012,
supra note 136.
238
The United States likely did not anticipate that China’s government procurement would grow
ten-fold in the span of one decade. See supra note 16.
239
In the negotiations leading up to China’s accession to the WTO, China stated that it “intended”
to join the GPA and that it would become an observer to the GPA and initiate negotiations to join the
GPA as soon as possible. See Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶¶ 339, 341. This is a “soft”
commitment and is not a legally binding.
240
See supra note 16.
241
See supra note 14.
242
China had a strong interest in joining the WTO because without WTO membership, China
endured a humiliating annual lecture and review of its human rights record by the U.S. Congress in
order to obtain the much lower Most Favored Nation tariffs from the United States. See Daniel C.K.
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leverage no longer exists. Indeed, the opposite may be true because the
negotiating leverage has now shifted in China’s favor. China may see little
benefit in joining the GPA, at least in its trading relationship with the
United States.243 This means that China has little incentive to join the GPA
or to join the GPA without significant exclusions of its government entities
from the GPA’s obligations. What may be necessary are trade concessions
in other areas, such as intellectual property, tariffs, and the use of
antidumping and countervailing duties,244 from the United States to induce
China to join the GPA on meaningful terms. In other words, instead of
using a “stick,” which seems to antagonize China, the United States and
other GPA members might consider using a “carrot.” One example of a
trade concession would be to enter in to a free trade agreement with China
under which some goods from members of the free trade agreement could
be traded with very low tariffs or duty free—with tariffs of zero.245 Other
examples of “carrots” might include commitments by the United States to
forgo the extremely aggressive use of trade remedies currently in place and
targeted at China,246 and to scale back on the aggressive use of U.S. trade

Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L LAW
(forthcoming 2013).
243
See supra Part III.C.
244
For a discussion of the controversy between the United States and China over dumping and
countervailing duties, see Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Coming Trade Wars with the United States, 81
UMKC L. REV. 257 (2012).
245
A free trade agreement (FTA) imposes zero tariffs on all goods (or a selected list of goods)
traded between the members of the FTA. FTAs are expressly allowed by the WTO. See GATT, supra
note 109, art. XXIV. Perhaps the most famous example of a free trade area is the European Union. The
United States has been particularly active in pursuing FTAs, both for trade and political purposes, i.e.,
the United States rewards friendly countries with FTAs. In recent years, the United States has
concluded bilateral FTAs with Australia, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Oman, Panama, the
South African Customs Union, Singapore, and South Korea. Several FTAs are now being negotiated,
including a Japan–U.S. FTA as well as an EU–U.S. FTA. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 56. China has also begun to pursue FTAs with
countries around the world. As of 2011, China has entered into FTAs with Chile, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Singapore, and the Association of South East Asian Nations. See Jun Zhao & Timothy
Webster, Taking Stock: China’s First Decade of Free Trade, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 65, 68 (2011).
China’s pursuit of FTAs indicates a new stage in China’s use of international law and international
institutions to cultivate economic relationships. See id.
246
The United States maintains that it is possible, despite a ruling from the WTO, to impose
antidumping duties and countervailing duties on the same imports from China. An antidumping duty is
an extra tariff imposed on a product that is “dumped” in the United States. See Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art.9, Apr. 15,
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement]. Dumping occurs if the product is
sold at a lower price in the U.S. market than in China. See id. art. 2. Suppose, for example, that a good
is sold for $100 in China and for $75 in the United States. In this case, dumping may exist. To offset
the margin of dumping, the United States can impose an additional tariff, called an antidumping duty, of
$25. See id. art. 9.1; see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at
443. A countervailing duty is an extra tariff imposed when a foreign government provides a payment to
a manufacturer contingent on export. See SCM Agreement, supra note 182, arts. 1, 3. Suppose, for
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laws to influence the internal political affairs of other countries.247
IV. CONCLUSIONS
China has a long-term goal of becoming an innovator of technology,
not a recipient of technology created by the United States and other
developed nations. China believes that it can never enter the top ranks of
the most competitive nations in the world unless it can develop its own
capacity to create world-class technology and intellectual property. A key
component of this strategy is a government procurement policy that favors
the government purchase of products and services containing technology
developed in China or owned by Chinese legal enterprises. This policy is
designed to spur innovation in China and to develop a capacity for future
innovation by Chinese industries, private inventors, and government
institutes. These policies have also caused a storm of controversy in the
United States, which claims that these measures are unfair and illegal under
the WTO.
An analysis of this controversy, however, has demonstrated that China
is likely within its legal rights in discriminating against foreign products
and services in government procurement under an exception to National
Treatment for government procurement. While some critics have argued
example, that the Chinese government pays a manufacturer of solar panels $100 per panel exported to
the United States. In this case, the United States can impose a countervailing duty of $25 to offset the
subsidy. See id. arts. 19.1–19.2. Recently, the United States began imposing anti-dumping duties and
countervailing duties on the same imports from China. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 496. Subsequently, China challenged this practice in the WTO. In
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011), the Appellate Body ruled that assessing both
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same imports from China without assessing whether such
duties would constitute double remedies violated Article 19.3 of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Agreement. In response, on March 13 2012, President Obama signed into law “An Act to Apply
the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Non-Market Economies, and for Other
Purposes,” Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265. The 2012 Act states that when the United States applies
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to the same imports from China, if the United States can
detect any double counting, the United States should reduce the duties to the extent of the double
counting. See Request for Consultation by China, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds-448-1(cr).pdf. In other words, the United States still intends to
impose both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports from China and will reduce the duties
to the extent of double counting if it can “detect” any double counting. This example is meant to
illustrate the extremely aggressive and hostile stance that the United States currently adopts towards
trade with China, which creates tension between the two countries. Some indication from the United
States that it intends to relax its aggressive stance might be viewed as a friendly gesture by China and
lead to a more positive attitude in joining the GPA.
247
See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human
Rights, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (describing how China feels threatened by
the United States’ aggressive use of trade to influence political reform in countries around the world
and China’s own efforts to create a competing approach).
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that China’s policies are in violation of other WTO obligations, the
problem with this approach is that even if China is in violation of other
WTO obligations, pressing those violations against China in the WTO
would not reach the result that is most desired by U.S. businesses and the
U.S. government. This preferred end result is China’s entry into the GPA
on meaningful terms, without broad exclusions that would significantly
weaken the scope of application of the GPA to China’s government
procurement. Joining the GPA is a voluntary decision and there is no way
to legally compel China to join the GPA. At this point, however, the
balance of power in negotiating leverage has shifted from the United States
and other WTO powers to China, which may have little incentive to join
the GPA. Since joining the GPA is an entirely voluntary decision, the
United States and other WTO countries might need to offer trade
concessions to induce China to the GPA.
For the long term, several larger lessons may be gleaned from this
controversy. Some have criticized China in the recent past for its failure to
respect intellectual property rights.248 Some have argued that China’s
shortcomings reflect a lack of understanding of the importance of
intellectual property in modern economic development.249
China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies should dispel this misconception once and
for all. China completely understands the importance of advanced
technology and intellectual property as well as the importance of being an
innovator country. In the author’s view, the issue has never been China’s
lack of understanding of the importance of intellectual property; rather, the
issue for China has always been how to get access to cutting-edge
advanced technology without having to pay exorbitant fees or to be subject
to onerous restrictions. One lesson from this controversy is that China now
wants to create powerful economic incentives to develop its own capacity
to innovate. This Article focuses on China’s Indigenous Innovation
policies as they relate to government procurement, but China is attempting
to create capacity through many different initiatives, including attracting
top-flight scientists and foreign faculty to Chinese universities.250
Achieving indigenous capacity to innovate is such a top national priority
that it appears unlikely any amount of pressure from U.S. companies will
deter China in reaching this goal.
A second lesson is that China has made significant progress in
248

See KERRY DUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40457, CHINA–U.S. RELATIONS: CURRENT
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R40457.pdf.
249
See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173–220 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007), available at
http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/ip/docs/ipResearch-op1.pdf.
250
See Liz Gooch, Chinese Universities Send Big Signals to Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/asia/12iht-educlede12.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

123

CHOW _FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/12/14 9:24 PM

34:81 (2013)

learning how to use the rules of the multilateral trading system effectively
and has come a long way since it negotiated its Protocol of Accession. The
Protocol of Accession contains a number of provisions that place China at a
disadvantage, including a number of “WTO plus” obligations251 that
require China to exceed requirements of the WTO. The controversy over
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies indicates, however, that China now
has the advantage in this set of negotiations. As China’s economic power
continues to grow, the United States and other members of the multilateral
trading system can also expect China’s expertise and sophistication in
matters of WTO law and its use of aggressive but effective negotiating
strategies in international trade to grow accordingly.
Finally, China’s own current pattern of action indicates that China
intends to pursue highly aggressive policies in international trade, within
the WTO, and on a bilateral basis with the United States. China’s conduct
indicates that the United States and other WTO members should not expect
China to be willing to compromise its own economic interests, even
slightly, in order to support broader systemic interests or changes that
might benefit the multilateral trading system as a whole, but not China
directly. To the contrary, China believes that it is within its rights to use
the rules of the multilateral trading system to its full advantage and to the
outer limits of the law, with the overriding goal of aggressively promoting
its own economic interests in order to increase its global power, influence,
and stature in the modern world.

251

See Julia Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003).
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